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DIVORCE JURISDICTION BY CONSENT OF THE PARTIES-
DEVELOPMENTS SINCE "SHERRER v. SHERRER"
MONRAD G. PAULSEN*
In theory, as far as federal law is concerned, the divorce decree of an
American state is entitled to full faith and credit only if the divorcing state had
jurisdiction of the subject matter by virtue of being the domicil of at least one
of the parties.' In practice, the decree of a state court which had personal juris-
diction over the parties to a marriage is entitled to full faith and credit so far as
the couple are concerned. According to the United States Supreme Court's
opinion in the Sherrer case,2 if both parties to a marriage participate in a suit
for a divorce they are estopped from attacking the jurisdictional basis of the
decree by virtue of their participation. Both had an opportunity to contest the
jurisdiction of the court on the ground that the divorcing state was not the
domicil of either. The parties are bound by a kind of res judicata principle.
The decision in the Sherrer case seemed to leave open two important full
faith and credit questions: 1) Were there still certain circumstances under
which one spouse could subsequently attack the decree although he had been
technically before the divorce court? 2) In the light of Sherrer's reliance on
a doctrine of res judicata, could a third person not a party to the divorce
challenge a divorce decree which the spouses themselves could not question?
The New Jersey Supreme Court has recently refused to find Sherrer bind-
ing in a case which raised the first of these questions. In Staedler v. Staedler
the husband, a New Jersey domiciliary, consulted a lawyer in 1946 about
getting a Florida divorce. When he learned that his wife had talked to a
lawyer of her own choosing, he threatened to leave New Jersey and to conceal
his assets. After a discussion with the husband's lawyer the wife, no longer
consulting her own counsel, signed an agreement which made certain financial
provision for her and which also provided:
[The wife] agrees promptly to execute any papers, and
enter, or cause to be entered any appearance required in the divorce
proceedings to be instituted by . . . [the husband], without delay.
Should . . . [the wife] oppose said divorce proceedings the said
trust shall become inoperative, and the monies deposited thereunder
shall be returned to . . . [the husband]."'
*A.B. 1940, University of Chicago; J.D. 1942, University of Chicago; Associate
Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.
1. GOODRIcH, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWs 395 (3d ed. 1941).
2. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948). Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948), is a
companion case. These cases are discussed in detail in Paulsen, Migratory Divorce:
Chapters III and IV, 24 IND. L.J. 25 (1948).
3. 78 A.2d 896 (N.J. 1951).
4. Id. at 899.
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When the husband arrived in Florida he engaged and paid for a lawyer to
represent his wife in the divorce proceedings. She executed the appropriate
papers to enter an appearance in the Florida hearing. By the husband's ad-
mission in the subsequent New Jersey case he did not arrive in Florida until
well after the date set forth in the Florida complaint. The period immediately
preceding the filing of the case in Florida included the Christmas holidays of
1947, during which time he returned to New Jersey, lived with his wife and
attended a number of social functions with her. At the trial the lawyer hired
to represent the wife performed a "perfunctory cross-examination . . . [and]
did little more than offer and prove his power of attorney to appear for
the . . . [wife]." The husband broke none of his business connections in
New Jersey and shortly after the Florida decree became final he returned
there, remarried. When payments to his first wife under the agreement
ceased seven months after they were begun, she sought a New Jersey divorce
and a decree for alimony. On appeal the New Jersey Supreme Court modified
the trial court's judgment by affirming the decree of divorce but reversing
the denial of alimony.
The New Jersey Supreme Court limited the application of the Sherrer
case to "a true adversary proceeding where the parties are represented by
counsel of their independent choice and where there is opportunity to make
voluntary decision on the question as to whether or not the case should be fully
litigated either on the question of jurisdiction or the merits .... -'
In the light of the interest of New Jersey in this family situation and the
fraud practiced on the Florida court, the New Jersey justices balked at em-
bracing the result to which Sherrer seemed to point. The following statement
shows the court's reluctance to permit the parties by mutual consent to confer
jurisdiction to divorce upon the courts of another state:
It cannot be disputed in this case that the bona fide domicile of
these parties was and is in the State of New Jersey and that this
state has a paramount interest in the status of its married domi-
ciliaries. To hold that jurisdiction could be established in the Florida
court or could be established there pursuant to the terms and condi-
tions of this agreement is to reduce the marital relationship to the
status of ordinary commercial transactions and to make it a matter of
barter by bargain and sale in the commercial markets. It is to say
that it is something that could be cancelled out by a general release
in return for a monetary consideration agreed upon at arms length
bargaining. No matter what others may perceive to be the recent
trend in decisions of the United States Supreme Court in causes of
this type we are constrained not to impute to that court an intent that
would reduce the solemn relationship of husband and wife to the
status just adverted to or that that court will acquiesce in a fraudu-
lent scheme to use the principles of the Davis, Sherrer and Coe cases as
5. Id. at 900.
6. Ibid.
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a device to infuse constitutional Vifility into the judgment of a court
of a sovereign state which has been deliberately deceived in proceed-
ing to judgment in a cause over which in fact it had no jurisdiction.7
A 1948 Oklahoma decision, Brasier v. Brasier,8 also refused tb give conclusive
effect to an Arkansas divorce obtained in a proceeding in which the defendant
wife signed an entry of appearance but did not file any pleadings nor secure
representation of counsel.
Whether the Sherrer case requires the reversal of Staedler v. Staedler
and Brasier v. Brasier is not certain. New Jersey's reading of the Sherrer
case has some justification. In Sherrer apparently both parties had lawyers
of their own choice, were physically present in the courtroom, and the re-
spondent in the divorce case testified in respect to the issue of the custody of
a child. Mr. Chief Justice Vinson's opinion in Sherrer repeatedly states that
the Florida decision on the domicil issue was binding because both parties had
"participated" in the divorce, a term which might indicate that Sherrer would
apply only to a case which preserved some flavor of a truly adversary
proceedingP
However, a dictum in a 1951 United States Supreme Court opinion,
Johnson v. Muelberger,'° tends to minimize this factor in Sherrer. In his sum-
mary of the holding of Sherrer v. Sherrer and its companion case Coe v. Coe,
Mr. Justice Reed said:
It is clear from the foregoing that under our decisions a state by
virtue of the clause must give full faith and credit to an out-of-state
divorce by barring either party to that divorce who has been per-
sonally served or who has entered a personal appearance from col-
laterally attacking the decree.1
The best guess seems to be that the New Jersey and Oklahoma courts were
in error.
A few state cases since Sherrer have been concerned with the question of
what constitutes an appearance sufficient to bring a defendant spouse per-
sonally before a divorce court. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
has held that Nevada did not acquire personal jurisdiction over a wife who
7. Id. at 901-902.
8. 200 Okla. 689, 200 P.2d 427 (1948). On April 3, 1951, the Supreme Court of Wis-
consin joined the New Jersey and Oklahoma courts in refusing to follow Sherrer in a case
in which the defendant wife merely entered a formal appearance before the court of the
divorcing state. "Under these circumstances we do not consider that the federal constitut-
tion nor the decisions interpreting it have called upon Wisconsin to surrender to the courts
of another state this remnant of its historic right to determine for itself the marital status
of its own residents, and we shall not surrender it until higher authority, speaking on the
instant facts or on others which are indistinguishable, requires us to do so." Davis v.
Davis, 47 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Wisc. 1951).
9. In the companion to Sherrer, Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948), the divorce was
actively contested.
10. 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
11. Id. at 587. (Emphasis added.)
COAIMENTS
filed an appearance through her attorney sometime after the date of the
husband's decree..1 2 Of course the Nevada appointment of a guardian ad litent
to defend a divorce case for a New Jersey -incompetent did not subject the
incompetent to the jurisdiction of Nevada 13 nor was a wife brought within
Nevada's power because an attorney, not authorized to do so, filed a pleading
on her behalf.1
4
The Staedler case is typical, one suspects, of a great many out-of-state
divorces carefully arranged by cooperating spouses. The Sherrer and Coe
cases were, of course, open invitations to the kind of collusion and fraud
practiced by the New Jersey litigants. Save for the slim chance that New
Jersey could still act through its criminal process the state has no way to
enforce its policy upon this couple who have lived and are still living there.
A state must bend to the standards of the laxest state in the Union if the
parties manipulate their affairs properly. For those who can leave their home
state temporarily the Sherrer case transferred control over the standards for
dissolution of New Jersey and New York marriages to Nevada, Florida and
Arkansas. If the aim was to make divorce easy'at the option of the parties,
the end was effectively achieved for those who can afford the trip to the
appropriate state.
Johnson v. Muelberger directly involved the second of the cquestions
posed by the Sherrer case. There a child sought to challenge, on j'urisdictional
grounds, her father's Florida divorce from his second wife. The question
arose when Johnson's third wife, seeking to elect her statutory share under
the law of New York, attacked Johnson's will which gave all his property
to his daughter by his first marriage. After the death of Wife No. 1,
Johnson had entered into a marriage which ended in a Florida divorce in 1942,
a proceeding in which both Johns'on and Wife No. 2 appeared. Johnson
married a third time following the Florida divorce. Neither Wife No. 2 nor
Johnson were bona fide domiciliaries of Florida at the time of the divorce.
The only substantial question in the Johnson litigation was whether the daugh-
ter of Wife No. 1 and Johnson could challenge the validity of a foreign
divorce between Johnson and Wife No. 2 in order to cut off Wife No. 3's
share in Johnson's estate.
Of course, New York first had to determine whether the daughter's
attack was possible under its own state law. In general, it is difficult to see
why a child should be permitted to raise doubts, in a collateral proceeding,
about the validity of his parent's divorces. 6  In a few comparatively rare
12. Rubinstein v. Rubinstein, 324 Mass. 340, 86 N.E.2d 654 (1949).
13. Glickenhaus v. Bradley, 63 A.2d 281 (Sup. Ct. N.J. 1949).
14. Commonwealth v. Bowser, 163 Pa. Super. 494, 63 A.2d 117 (1949).
15. 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
16. This is the conclusion reached in a Note, Standing of Children to Attack Their
Parents' Divorce Decree, 50 COL. L. REv. 833 (1950).
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instances invalidation of a divorce will save a child from the stigma of
illegitimacy. But cases of a child's collateral attack generally arise from the
child's attempt to secure a larger inheritance at the expense of a supposed
wife. In the typical case the struggle is between an adult child and a post
divorced wife of a husband over the property in an estate. In spite of the
great hardship in many cases on the part of a deceased's most recent apparent
spouse, New York permits the collateral attack by the child at least as to the
decrees of other states.
17
In the Johnson case, therefore, the daughter would succeed unless pre-
vented by force of the federal full faith and credit requirement. The opinion
in the New York Court of Appeals failed to deal with the issue sharply."8
Although that court selected and quoted statements from the Sherrer case
which seemed to limit its application to situations in which the spouses them-
selves attempted to secure invalidation of their divorce, the New York opinion
fell short of saying flatly that the daughter could attack the jurisdictional
basis of the Florida divorce because she had not been a party and had had no
opportunity to contest the issue of domicil. Instead, the court fell back to
another line: New York could permit the daughter's attack because Florida
also would permit it.
Thistack of the New York opinion may help to explain the direction of
Mr. Justice Reed's Supreme Court essay. The greater portion of it is devoted
to a concise restatement of the full faith and credit clause's impact on
divorce recognition law and to a correction of New York's estimate of the
Florida law. As the Supreme Court read the Florida cases a stranger could
not impeach a Florida decree of divorce there even on the ground that the
jurisdiction over the subject matter was lacking. What of it? Admitting
the daughter could not challenge the jurisdiction of the Florida divorce in a
Florida court, why is she bound by the Florida law in a New York court?
Mr. Justice Reed's opinion answered the question only with an assertion:
We conclude that Florida would not permit Mrs. Muelberger to
attack the Florida decree of divorce between her father and his
second wife as beyond the jurisdiction of the rendering court. In that
case New York cannot permit such an attack by reason of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause. When a divorce cannot be attacked for
lack of jurisdiction by parties actually before the court or strangers
in the rendering state, it cannot be attacked by them anywhere in
the Union. The Full Faith and Credit Clause forbids. 9
This conclusion, however, is not self-evident. True, the statute passed
pursuant to the full faith and credit clause requires a state to give a judg-
17. E.g., Urquhart v. Urquhart, 272 App. Div. 60, 69 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1st Dep't 1947),
aff'd, 297 N.Y. 689, 77 N.E.2d 7 (1947).
18. It re Johnson's Estate, 301 N.Y. 13, 92 N.E.2d 44 (1950).
19. Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 589 (1951).
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ment or decree the same effect as it has in the state from which it is taken."
The Florida rule on a child's standing to challenge a parents' divorce must be
applied in New York if it is considered one of the effects of a valid Florida
judicial proceeding. Yet, the full faith and credit requirement has never been
imposed in the case of a judgment or decree entered without jurisdiction.2
Unless the Johnson case has changed matters, a divorce is not entitled to full
faith and credit unless it is based on the domicil of one of the parties. Under
the doctrine of the Sherrer case parties who were personally subject to the
divorcing court may not question the decree's basis because each of them
could have raised and contested the jurisdictional issue of domicil at the time
of the divorce. The daughter contended: the Florida decree was granted by
a court lacking power to do so and hence was void; the Court answered: one
of the effects of the decree was to bind strangers who had no economic or
personal interest in the marriage status at the time of the divorce. The answer
is something less than satisfying as a matter of doctrinal nicety.
It would make explanation no easier for the Court to have labeled the
divorce an in ren proceeding and to have recalled that an in rein judgment
"binds the whole world." 2  Surely any person having an interest (even a
later-acquired interest) can challenge an in rem decree on the ground that the
res was not within the jurisdiction of the state purporting to act upon it.28
Perhaps it would have been possible to work out a thesis under which the
daughter is bound by Florida's finding on the domicil question because her
father was bound and she stands in no better position than he.24 The Court
could have taken the position that, when both spouses have appeared, the sub-
ject matter of the action, their status, is within the power of the divorce court.
The Supreme Court's opinion, however, does not rest on these grounds.
Florida does not permit the daughter's attack; therefore, New York may not.
If the United States Supreme Court really means to approach divorce
cases by adhering to the literal terms of the full faith and credit statute, the
doctrine of the second Williams 25 case is now unsound. In Nevada an ex parte
divorce granted after sixty days of residence is apparently immune there
from collateral attack on jurisdictional grounds by the non-appearing spouse.
If so, then how is it possible for North Carolina to permit the attack? Does
not the full faith and credit clause forbid? Williams II, it should be re-
20. "Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated,
shall have the same faith and credit in every court within the United States and its
Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State,
Territory or Possession from which they are taken." 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1948).
21. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45
CoL. L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1945).
22. Cf. Bane v. Bane, 80 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
23. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 73, comment a and § 74, comment a (1942).
24. Cf. In re Anderson's Estate, 121 Mont. 515, 194 P.2d 621 (1948).
25. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
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rfiembered, has neverreceived the unaniinous approval of the Court. Of the
C6urt's preseni members; two, Justices Black and Douglas, were in dissent.
In the rot recent Supreme Court application and extension of Williams II,
Rice v. Rice,20 the Court split five to four. The new Justices, Clark and Min-
ton, have not had occasion to vote on the question. The Johnson case may
foreshadow the demise of Williams II by no longer permitting a spouse to at-
tack a decree if it cannot be challenged in the state where the divorce was
granted.
It seems more probable that the Court will adhere to Williams II to pro-
tect the abandoned spouse from an ex parte decree obtained in one of the
easy divorce states without a bona fide change in the domicil of the plaintiff.
The practical result of the. Johnson case then will be to round out the Sherrer
development in the full faith and credit law of divorce. The parties to a
marriage, it seems, now have the power to confer jurisdiction over their status
upon any state whose divorce laws are expedient. The decree can be attacked
neither by the spouses nor by third persons unless the state in which the
decree was granted would permit an attack in its own courts.
When the actual operation of the Williams, Sherrer and Johnson line of
cases is considered perhaps the theory of divorce jurisdiction for full faith
and credit purposes should be recast. Are there not, in fact, two jurisdictional
bases for divorces which are entitled to full faith and credit; the domicil of
either spouse or personal jurisdiction over both? As the matter now stands,
ex parte divorces are entitled to full faith and credit only when the divorcing
state has jurisdiction over the subject matter by virtue of being the domiciliary
state of at least one party. But when the divorcing court has in personam
jurisdiction over both spouses, whether that court really has jurisdiction of
the subject matter may no longer be important for constitutional purposes.
The recent federal cases have permitted a court having personal jurisdiction
over the couple to enter a decree which the parties and even strangers to the
divorce proceeding are barred from questioning. Therefore, when a court has
personal jurisdiction over both parties to a divorce, does not that court have
a completely sufficient basis on which to grant a decree entitled to full faith
and credit ?27
The test whether jurisdiction over both persons is now an adequate basis
for the divorces which must be accorded federally required recognition could
come if a state, having jurisdiction over both spouses, would grant a divorce
in a proceeding which did not, expressly or impliedly, put the question of
domicil in issue. For example, a state might, under its local law, grant a di-
-26. 336 U.S. 674 (1949).
27. To these speculations a caveat must be added. The Johnson case was not a
bigamy prosecution and it still may be possible that the state of New York could have
prosecuted Mr. Johnson for bigamy during his marriage to Wife No. 3 on the grounds
that his divorce from Wife No. 2 was invalid.
COMMENTS
vorce on the basis of residence rather than domicil.28  Even if both parties
made an appearance in a case in that state, the fact of domicil would not be
determined. Presumably either party as well as others could raise the issue
later. If personal jurisdiction over the couple is now a sufficient basis for
a divorce, the domicil question would, of course, prove to be irrelevant.
Irrespective whether new full faith and credit jurisdiction-' rules can be
stated, after the Sherrer and Coe cases were decided the outcome of Jol zson
v. Muelberger was inevitable. The certainty about status to which the parties
are entitled demands the result. If the couple are bound to respect a divorce
decree, their marital status should be determined equally for others. It is
enough they may be divorced for some purposes but not for others.2 0 It is
too much they should be married when the interests of strangers are in ques-
tion but divorced when either of them raises the matter of status.
28. Apparently a state may divorce on any jurisdictional basis it chooses without
violating the due process clause. See the discussion in Paulsen, Migratory Divorce:
Chapters III and IV, 24 IN). L.J. 25, 43-44 (1948).
29. See Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
